“Brazil’s Century?”, the fourteenth and final chapter of Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power makes predictions for Brazil’s future in the coming century based on current trends and paths that the country is currently on. A central theme of the chapter is the Brazilian idea of overcoming the complexo de vira-latas (“mongrel complex”) that had plagued the country for so long. Despite the obvious fact, that Brazil still has a lot of progress still to be made, a lot of progress has been made since the fall of the dictatorship in the 1980s.
The fall of the long-standing military rule of the country ushered in a new era of change for Brazil. After some immediate chaos that formed in the vacuum of the martial law, a new democratic government promising liberal reform was envisioned. This change, which created the modern Brazilian republic, was embraced by Brazilians of all walks of life. When Cardoso came to power in 1989, his liberal economic reform came as a result of a consensus reached among politicians, though such agreement would would prove to be rare in the coming decades. The liberal economic policies stalled the inflation that had hurt the country during the military dictatorship. Brazil experienced economic expansion that was driven mainly by the stabilization driven by the commodity boom. Many Brazilians took this for granted, but economists realized that in order for Brazil to reach its desired level of GDP, it would have to significantly reform public spending. Because of this revelation, the country started to invest in elevating their productivity to create faster growth. However this growth came at the expense of the classes C, D, and E. When the call for increased liberal economic policies came, the call was not immediately answered, and was actually ignored for a short while. This is because of Brazil’s innate conservative nature. Brazil’s “allergy to liberalism” (Reid 287) stemmed from the power structure that had long defined the country to the time when it was still an empire; power was concentrated with the top, trickling down to the bottom. The end result was, that, two hundred years later, Brazil would see progression come at the speed of a snail. Cardoso’s liberal reform being adopted with open arms was in many ways, a rare phenomenon in Brazilian politics. It is important to note that the push for progression is largely held back by the politicians, not by the people, who have protested for reform on a large scale at least three times. Political corruption, fiscal deficits, and many other similar previously discussed problems were also at play for the lack of reform. The perfect storm of problems that faced Brazil during the 20th century not only catalyzed the social progression of the country, but also set the stage for it to become an influential global power. In many ways, both the former and the latter are true today, as although the country still has significant challenges ahead, it has made significant progress in a short amount of time. Brazil will quite possibly succeed in facing those challenges as well, since the periodic protests for reform only accelerate the change that comes to the nation. So to answer the question posed at the beginning of the chapter, will the 21st century be Brazil’s century? Given what we have seen happen in the country during the past two decades, and that the political structure is going through changes not seen for a long time, we are potentially looking at a Brazilian transformation that could make it a 21st century global power.
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Chapter 13: “An Unreformed Leviathan”
Chapter thirteen, “An Unreformed Leviathan,” discusses the socio-economic and political changes (and lack thereof) that had shaped Brazil during the 20th and 21st century. The highlight of the chapter is the failure of the Brazilian socio-economic class system. The system, which was divided alphabetically by A, B, C, D, and E in that specific order from highest to lowest. This flawed system suffered a wakeup call when the Free Fare Movement political group started a protest rally in Sao Paulo to fight against recent significant increases to the Sao Paulo bus system. The protests were later broken up by police, which only added to the anger and frustration felt by Brazilians from the lower social classes (mainly D, and E, but also some of C too). In addition, cuts to public spending to make way for the 2013 FIFA Confederation only angered people even more. Dilma’s approval ratings plummeted for a short while, as her policies were the polar opposite of what the lower classes needed. Dilma’s poll rating rose again nonetheless, as she vowed to create pacts for public transportation spending. While on the outside, the class struggle was at a crisis point, on the inside of Congress, problems that had been heating up for a while finally boiled over. The PT had long suffered from an ideological identity crisis. When it was founded in the 1980s, it was an attempt to thwart the rise of a conservative police state from emerging in Brazil. Shortly afterwards, the PSDB, which would be Cardoso’s party, was formed. A rivalry was born between the two parties that would shape the nation for the next few decades. This competition not only led to an atmosphere of gerrymandering, but also created a considerably divided Congress. This rift would exacerbate the already serious problem involving public spending. Because of the ongoing fiscal deficit, Brazil’s level of economic development was curbed significantly, and state government was making it worse by not boosting productivity in key areas such as infrastructure. Inequality still plagued the demographics as well. But the situation was about to get much worse, as the Brazilian pension bubble was about to burst. For a long time in Brazil, pension spending had been quite high, with the richest 20% of the citizens getting 3.6 times more public social spending than the bottom 20%. As a result of this ludicrous spending imbalance, certain programs, particularly education and its quality stayed stagnant instead of rising. This was also hindered by the Congressional corruption, which had long been public knowledge but the effects of which were once again being thrust into the limelight. This corruption included the siphoning off of public money and the money theft. The flashpoint came when PMDB deputy Natan Donadon, representing the northwestern state of Rondônia, was arrested, convicted, and imprisoned for stealing R$8 million while he was Rondônia’s finance director. Despite this, he was not expelled from office. This blatant corruption climaxed into a struggle to reform the government to eliminate both the political corruption and the Congressional infighting. After the Donadon scandal, the PSDB and the PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party) were instrumental in transforming the education systems of Minas Gerais and Pernambuco, dropping poverty levels in both places. More importantly though, regional NGOs expanded their operations to monitor corruption, which was very helpful in spreading their uncovered information to the general public. When Congress was debating ideas to reform the representation system, the PT opted for having the campaigns financed exclusively from public donors and party candidates to be determined by the party leadership. When protests erupted because of this, Congress passed legislation barring politicians guilty of a crime from taking public office. The protests surrounding Dilma, and the lack of reforms galvanized the push for accelerated change in Brazil. There are several socio-economic and political actions that shaped the country in the last few years that were in the making for several decades. First, the failed alphabetical social class led to protests for reforms for public spending. Cuts to spending the government conducted because of sports and cultural events also contributed. Next, the competition between the PT and the PSDB evolved into classic infighting that was accompanied by gerrymandering and gridlock that led to increased public frustration and failed attempts at reform for key services such as infrastructure and the horribly skewed pension system. The protests increased, but this time, there was a government response. Several cities saw overhauls in their education systems and NGO anti-corruption monitoring skyrocketed, increasing public awareness of corruption. This change shows the key message of the chapter of how the Congressional congestion produced a perfect storm of maleficence that led to intense public frustration which finally led to some progression in certain areas. Chapter twelve, “Global Ambitions and Frustrations” begins Part III: “Prospects” and plunges into Brazilian international relations. While the chapter does cover the relations during Cardoso’s administration, it largely discusses international relations under Lula and, to a lesser extent, Dilma. The former of the two was legendary for his friendly relations with many politicians who were largely considered to be dictators, such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Muammar Qaddafi.
Cardoso’s presidency coincided with the fall of communism. As a result, his international diplomacy package consisted largely of regional unity, international alliances, and global outreach for change and prosperity. In addition, he saw an ally in the United States. This reaching out to the US would come to be an advantage as it would avoid risks of confrontation. When Lula became president in the election of 2002, he reached out even further among the regional and international community. In addition, he continued Cardoso’s system of “soft” economic policies. For example, he was a staunch advocate of Argentinean re-industrialization and was an influential voice in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, simultaneous trade blocs, such as the Pacific Alliance between Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Colombia threatened this. This ironically fostered a “competitive liberalization” (Reid 252) within the region, further increasing growth. In addition, Lula expanded Brazil’s international outreach with many nations. This was most successful in Africa. He established diplomatic ties with twenty-five African nations and created a number of embassies in said countries. He also did support several despotic regimes in not just Africa, but also Asia, becoming thick as thieves with Qaddafi. But the most significant relationship Lula had with any foreign leader was his with George W. Bush. Lula’s relationship with George W. Bush began shortly after he was elected after December 2002. Lula and Bush both thought of each other as leaders to whom they could relate. Lula often gave Bush a helping hand when confronting South American anti-American leaders such as Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales. Despite the relationship between Lula and Bush, Lula would not share the same feelings towards Bush’s successor Barack Obama, whom he thought of as having a cold attitude. Because of the cold atmosphere between the two countries’ leaders, the US became more self-reliant on Latin American affairs. This continued under Dilma’s presidency, during which it was revealed that the NSA had been spying on Dilma’s emails. Chapter twelve’s focus is on Brazil’s role in the international community, especially with the United States. There were several defining moments in Brazil’s diplomatic history. First, Cardoso’s decision to reach out to the US started off the Brazilian Republic’s relationship with the then-recently promoted sole superpower. This fostered continued growth under Cardoso’s term and further under Lula’s. Simultaneously, Brazil was taking an active role in trade blocs with other nations. These are the liberal economic policies that would eventually come back to hurt Brazil. It was also during this time when Lula developed his friendship with George W. Bush, and when the United States became involved in South American affairs, with Brazil often siding with the US. However, when Barack Obama came to power, Lula was quite put out and relations stalled. This distance continued with Dilma after she came to office. The unfriendly relations of two Brazilian presidents with one US president caused some political rifts that still exist between the two nations. Chapter Eleven, “Brazil’s Guided Capitalism,” discusses the issues of Brazil’s current issues with capitalism, industry, and international competition. In particular, Brazil’s long-standing rivalry with China over industry and manufacturing. The chapter then continues to discuss the topic at the heart of the issue, cost of Brazilian labor and the struggle that businesses face with it.
The chapter starts off with chronicling the story of Embraer, Brazil’s foremost aircraft manufacturing company, which started off in the 1990s and since then had climbed the ladder to being the number one power in the nation’s aircraft manufacturing. But the tsunami of the 2008 Wall Street crash hit Embraer quite hard. Massive layoffs were made and the company revamped its business model. Rather than go with its originally proposed business strategy and compete with Boeing, Airbus and similar corporations, they went with their plan b of increasing fuel efficiency in their already-existing line of jets. This plan b turned out to benefit the company, as Embraer had already had been hired by government agencies for military aircraft, and were working with companies such as Boeing on those projects. Embraer is an adaptable Brazilian company which is able to change its business strategy for the better. This is not just an isolated incident, as other Brazilian companies, such as what the electrical technologies company Weg has done in recent years. Weg has managed to attract foreign customers and still maintain the bulk of their operation in Brazil during a time in which real was strong and production costs would have been high. Both Embraer and Weg are clear examples of successful Brazilian private enterprises, and how it can work in the country if done right. Unfortunately, however, many businesses are not as adaptable as Weg or Embraer, and they have succumbed to many economic factors. These factors all stem from the issue of production costs when concerning competition in the international marketplace, and to alleviate the problem, the left-leaning administrations of Lula and Dilma sought to increase government intervention in the manufacturing industries. In the past decade and a half, cheap Chinese manufacturing costs have put the Brazilian industry at a crossroads. In response to this, Lula’s government created a system of subsidies and protectionist policies to support the manufacturing industries. Also, the nation saw the expanded involvement of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) in managing industry. For example, the BNDES was attempting to jump start several companies involved in the manufacture of electronics. However, at the same time, the BNDES was creating the false appearance of a healthy credit market, thereby hurting commercial banks. It was after this revelation that many Brazilians began to oppose what they saw as the excess government involvement of the BNDES into the private manufacturing industry. Despite, when Dilma’s term began in 2011, many of her policy plans concerning the BNDES were to further increase government intervention. This big government policy had serious drawbacks for a major industry: automobile manufacturing. There was infighting between the government and private sector about imports and how there were auto parts that were being imported from cheap labor countries. The auto companies struck back by creating an import tariff.This bickering has con for several more years. Apart from Brazilian cars, the shoe industry was undergoing a geographic relocation; one was to the Brazilian northeast, the second was to China. Prior to this move, many shoe factories were located in Rio Grande de Soul in the city of Novo Hamburgo, the “National Capital of Shoes.” Now, however, they were relocating to the northeast and China because of the far cheaper labor there in sweatshops. Despite this exodus, some shoe-manufacturing firms still maintained a foothold in Novo Hamburgo, where they grew to compete fiercely with European companies. The Brazilian shoe industry and the exodus of shoe companies from Novo Hamburgo revealed much about productivity in Brazil, which was a spreading problem among the labor force. For many Brazilians, the rather low productivity came as a result of excessive monetary burdens such as taxes and interest rates. Between the 1980s and 2012, there was a thirteen percent tax hike among Brazilians. This hurt the Brazilian poor unusually hard, and when coupled with the oppressive labor laws, many of them either became unemployed or underemployed. Other issues that were supplemental included the long-standing issues with inflation and debt, but the largest bulwark to productivity was repeated insistence of government interventions in the private sector. However this did change as a result of a need to fix the crumbling Brazilian infrastructure, when in 2013, they auctioned off contracts for federal highway repair. Private investing increased following this, helping industry once more. Manufacturing was then feeling a reprieve thanks in large part to depreciation of the real. This began the modern prosperity felt by the Brazilian private sector. The key points of Chapter Eleven revolve around the interaction of Brazil’s private sector with that of the international community and the interaction of the private sector with the government. First, the emergence of Chinese cheap manufacturing hurt Brazilian businesses causing some to fail, but others to adapt and grow. Second, the excess government involvement initiated during Lula’s administration and the early years of Dilma’s administration caused a ricochet effect on certain Brazilian industries. When the government increased privatization of the infrastructure system, intervention into the manufacturing industry subsided. Both of these factors led to the the current growth of the Brazilian private sector. Chapter 10 covers the Brazilian oil and farming boom of the late 20th century and early 21st century. Specifically, the struggle between private and government-run enterprise is a major discussion topic in terms of oil, and the issue of the destruction of the Amazon as integral to understanding trends in Brazilian farming.
Brazilian offshore oil was first discovery in the 1990s. By 2007, Eike Batista, Brazilian’s prominent tycoon and CEO of OGX (Eike’s oil and gas company), was constructing the Açu Superport just north of Rio to serve the growing oil industry. Around the same time, several new deep offshore wells were discovered, further increasing the demand for the port. However, many of Eike’s wells would be plagued by production problems and development costs. By July 2013, OGX had active wells only in the Tubarão Azul field, as the others became so plagued with the aforementioned production and development issues. As production declined, OGX’s share prices dropped and dropped. At long last, OGX filed for bankruptcy in October 2013 after facing US$5 billion in debt and millions more in interest payments. Like a row of dominos, Eike’s other companies folded. In a matter of months, Eike’s domination of the Brazilian oil business was no more. As this was happening, Brazil’s national oil company, Petrobras, was also facing constraints with their wells and the unproductive Brazilian economy. Petrobras’s offshore drilling operations began in the 1960s. The subsequent decades saw a massive price increase in the extraction of Brazilian crude, as the country increasingly saw a need to curb dependence on foreign oil. Further decades later, in 2007, Petrobras’s discovery of the massive deep-sea fields would be poised to increase production further. After the pre-sal plan was developed to safely ensure production, Dilma (who was then the head of the board of directors for Petrobras), formed the state-owned company Pré-Sal Petroléo (PPSA). Petrobras and the PPSA then doubled their efforts to build new tankers and other transportation equipment to be used in the new oil fields. Unfortunately, the cost of these materials, coupled with development costs of drilling in the geologically hazardous fields, caused significant problems for Petrobras. The high development costs came as a result of drilling precautions that followed the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico. In 2013, after Dilma had taken office, she appointed Maria das Graças Foster to serve as the new CEO of the company in an effort to alleviate the dilemma. Maria’s plan was to cut operational costs significantly. This decision was made even as production at most of Petrobras’ oil fields was sharply dropping. The cut to operational costs was made despite this because pre-sal fields, the company’s most profitable, were still increasing in production. To add to the company’s already mounting problems, inflation of the real started to take hold once again, resulting in massive plunges to Petrobras’ market share. Starting in May 2013, Brazil held its auction of offshore drilling licenses with record bidders. With the second auction in October, for the deep pre-sal fields, there was only one bidder, a consortium of companies including Petrobras, Shell and two Chinese firms. While the dangerous pre-sal drilling was abandoned, the record bids indicated a high interest in Brazilian oil. Investments started flooding in, especially to the new oil superpower in the country, General Electric. GE has several large technology institutes in Brazil, and their power only grew afterwards. This set the stage for Brazil to potentially become the world leader in energy production. Apart from oil, an agricultural revolution was taking place in Brazil. By the twenty-first century, Brazil was already the world’s chief agricultural superpower, being a major exporter of coffee, sugar, orange juice, and beef and poultry. This revolution was catalyzed by the establishment of the Embrapa, an agricultural postgraduate degree institute and the exodus of southern Brazilian farmers (gauchos) into the newly opened cerrado savanna of central Brazil. This sustained growth help to prop up many related industries, such as biofuels and biochemicals. Eventually, the agricultural operations began to encroach on Brazilian Amazonia, causing a backlash by environmentalists. The government under Lula, who was a staunch believer in fighting climate change, slowly reversed this deforestation. But preserving the Amazon ecosystem wasn’t the sole thing warranting preservation. There were also many Amerindian tribes that were facing displacement. The most notable instance of this was the proposed construction of the Belo Monte Dam, which would dam up the Xingu River and threaten the continued existence of many native tribes. Eventually the dam was redesigned to work around this and become a run-of-river dam which would create a smaller reservoir. The project, still under construction, is still criticized because of its environmental and social impacts. In this chapter, the main focal points were mainly economic and environmental. The production and developmental costs that were faced by both Eike’s OGX and Petrobras came as a result of new drilling precautions needed to prevent deep sea oil spills. When these costs were too high, both companies had to abandon their projects, leaving the market open for foreign companies. In the Brazilian agricultural world, the exodus of the gauchos to the cerrado coincided with the beginning of expansion into the region because of economic pressures. When the agricultural expansion encroached on the Amazon Basin, environmental groups worked tooth and nail to stop it. They largely succeeded in stalling deforestation, which decreased by over 15,000 square kilometers. The protests did not just stop with the deforestation, but also with large-scale hydroelectric dams such as the Belo Monte. Protests over the Belo Monte eventually led to a redesign of the dam, although the said redesign still have flaws. These protests and the actions that they brought about were a step in the right direction for the nation. In Chapter 9, Reid’s primary talking point concerns the struggle of the Brazilian poor and the attempts by Dilma to alleviate their pain and social stigma to create a Brazil with a stable middle-class, a long sought-after dream. The blight of the Brazilian poverty was a result of various political, economic, and also circumstantial issues. The circumstantial aspects are mainly geographical and meteorological.
Much of Brazilian poverty has been concentrated in the northeast sector of the country. That region consists of a mix of coastal tropical forests and inland sertão. In both areas farming is the significant economic engine, and in both areas, meteorological phenomena often threatened and devastated these areas. In the coastal forests, malnutrition and famine were the worst social issues. This was aggravated by environmental destruction of the forests, which was commonly done via slashing-and-burning, which in the long run causes nutrient depletion in the soil, thus continuing the famine. In the sertão, drought was and is the major issue, and crop shortages are a major issue, which only exacerbate the poverty. Economics and politics also played a substantial part in the poverty surrounding this region. During the dictatorship era, the northeast underwent fast, unregulated growth just like the rest of Brazil, but the new wealth was not redistributed and the eventual massive inflation only made problems worse. Brazilian democracy eventually would help to ameliorate these problems. In 1989, when Cardoso was elected President, many of his policies shrunk the wage inequality from the get-go. In 2002, Lula’s Bolsa Familia helped out the denizens of the northeast even more. Wages increased. This was because of faster growth, and with it faster job creation. In addition, the northeast underwent a major education reform, leading to a more educated, and hence higher paid workforce. Lastly social programs like Bolsa Familia allowed the impoverished to climb the rungs to a higher standard of living. Dilma too planned to continue the shrinkage of the income inequality in the northeast. Specifically, she planned to eliminate “absolute poverty” of making less than R$70 a month per person. Unfortunately, however, her policies would create more controversy and less success than she had hoped for. Dilma’s social programs for the northeast mainly consisted of cash payments to families with an income level below her proposed R$70 a month threshold. In addition, she heavily relied on teams of social workers and health experts to find families in the northeast that had slipped through the cracks of the government safety net. The effects of these approaches were quite promising; some suggested “a new middle class” was being created, not just in the northeast, but throughout the rest of Brazil as well. But this new class was in many ways becoming just a new and improved poor class instead of being absorbed into the true Brazilian middle class. Many of the “new poor” communities were still plagued from drug crime and gang violence. Many sociologists and analysts realized that in order for Brazil to reach an income inequality compatible with a middle-class society, they would have to accelerate the shrinkage of the income gap and hold it steady for several decades; needless to say, many political analysts found this to be an impossibility. Brazil was trying to enable growth via domestic consumption, but since that had run its course, economists needed to find new viable options. The government came to rely more on public services to assist the Brazilian poor. Health care systems were especially important. But these programs were not foolproof, and so private groups, such as Pastoral da Criança, a Catholic organization designed to train women in health care, contributed. The governmental health care system was inefficient in part because of political corruption. Also, there was a shortage of doctors in many of the more impoverished regions of Brazil. To alleviate this issue, Dilma enacted a system to recruit foreign doctors to those regions. While fighting the health care issue, Dilma was simultaneously reforming the education system of Brazil’s northeast. Education reform had previously started during Cardoso’s administration when his education minister, Renato Souza, revamped the education system, supplying many schools with textbooks and money for meal plans directly, avoiding the gridlocked bureaucracy of the region. Fernando Haddad, the education minister from 2005 to 2012, expanded funding even more so, as well as financial incentives for schools at both ends of the performance spectrum. Despite this, the education system still had a high rate of grade repetition and an above average dropout level. Sociologists realized that the problem lay in the focus of the education. Teachers were using academic lecturing to teach their pupils instead of age-appropriate interactive stimulation. As a result, kids weren’t learning as much as they could have, leading to dropouts and grade repetition. Besides Brazil’s lopsided education system, there were also unaddressed racial issues which were tearing the country apart. The Brazilian racial divide had been long-standing in the country. By the time of Dilma, the divide was mainly concentrated along the lines of black/brown and white. Brazilians of Amerindian and African descent were usually at lower rungs of the Brazilian social pyramid. The reforms enacted by the republic had given the lower ethnicities a slight boost, but there was still rampant inequity. By Dilma’s term, the Supreme Court had recently upheld a controversial decision to establish an affirmative action system for universities which would set quotas for the number of students of a particular ethnicity to enroll in that university. Although this was intended to help the disenfranchised, its effect at reversing inequality was little if none at all. The biggest issue for Brazilians regarding changing the racial divide was simply a change of attitude, which many Brazilians were not inclined to embrace. The race conflict was also organized along the lines of housing. In Rio, for instance, the poor lived in the morros (hills) upon which the favelas were concentrated. The upper-class cariocas of Rio lived in the asfalto environment of the cities. These areas were ridden with gangs and corruption, with both middle-class and upper-class cariocas hesitant to address the problem. The response was to drastically increase the police force in the dysfunctional and gang-ridden slums. This crackdown was more than just an increase in the police force, but also of private security firms and neighborhood watch groups. The primary task of these groups was to fight the gang-problems and the cocaine epidemic that was sweeping through the Brazilian poor. This more or less constituted a “Brazilian war on drugs” to combat the drug trafficking and crime, especially those involving crack cocaine.. This crackdown did have an unfortunate consequence. It dramatically increased the prison population in Brazil, to around 515,000 in 2011. In this chapter, the main events revolve around the Brazilian poor and political decision-making around them. First, the rise of Brazilian democracy significantly contributed to a living increase among the extremely poor (especially in the northeast). The republic enacted programs like Bolsa Familia that gave impoverished families a boost. The next series of events concern the policies and events of Dilma’s administration. The first such policy was that of creating government safety nets to find impoverished families in need of government assistance. In addition, there was significant help given to school systems to increase graduation rates and encourage academic excellence. While these programs in and of themselves are not mistakes, Dilma and her administration made the mistake by thinking that these problems could just be snuffed out of existence. The idea was that the government could enact policies like waving a magic wand over the problem. The end result revealed the obvious that even though Brazil had made considerable progress, it still had a lot of work to do. Also, the administering of education in the impoverished areas was quite provincial and unmodernized, leading to continued rates of high school incompletion. The ethnic and social issues also erupted during Dilma’s term and was promptly dealt with by enacting affirmative action programs and by cracking down on drugs which were ravaging slums. The affirmative action program was unpopular among the Brazilian populace because it differed from long-held social norms. The war on drugs program was also criticized not only because it significantly increased the prison population, but also because many impoverished Brazilians were jailed for simply drug offenses. All in all, the policies used by the Brazilian Republic to combat poverty and crime had a mixed outcome. In certain instances, the policies worked well, but not well enough to fully combat the problems. In other scenarios, the policies used were utter failures. |
Andy Jay CrossI am a sophomore Sustainability major at Stockton University.
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